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I 
INTRODUCTION 
More than one hundred and thirty countries or jurisdictions now have laws 
that seek to safeguard and foster market competition.1 At a minimum, such 
competition laws prohibit agreements among supposed competitors to fix prices, 
divide markets, or in other ways avoid or undermine market competition.2  Often, 
these laws go much further. Many additionally seek to constrain the exercise of 
market power of monopolies and dominant firms in the market for a particular 
good or service by authorizing regulatory interventions, at least when there is 
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1. For a review of the literature and up-to-date analyses of the process of competition law diffusion, 
see Umut Aydin, The International Diffusion of Competition Laws, Paper presented at the Instituto de 
Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (June 19, 2015); Tim Büthe & Shahryar 
Minhas, The Global Diffusion of Competition Laws: A Spatial Analysis, Paper presented at the 6th 
Meeting of the UNCTAD Research Partnership Platform on Competition and Consumer Protection, 
Geneva (July 2015) (on file with the authors). 
2. In the U.S. tradition, laws prohibiting anti-competitive behavior (from cartels to the abuse of
dominance in a particular market) are also known as antitrust laws. 
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evidence of an abuse of such market power.  Many also require advance approval 
of mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures by a public regulatory agency to 
ensure that such transactions do not create monopolies or have other serious anti-
competitive effects. A number of competition laws even establish a broader 
competition policy that authorizes competition agencies to engage in advocacy 
vis-à-vis society to establish a “culture” of competition—and vis-à-vis 
government entities at the national or subnational level to raise awareness of 
anti-competitive effects of laws, regulations, or administrative decisions and to  
urge legislative, regulatory, and other executive bodies to achieve public policy 
objectives in ways that are compatible with keeping markets competitive. 
Many of today’s 130 plus competition law jurisdictions are newcomers—more 
than two thirds of them enacted their first competition laws within the past 
twenty-five years.3 Most of these new competition law jurisdictions are 
developing countries, where conditions are hardly conducive to the successful 
implementation of pro-market legislation. A large number of them are poor or 
even very poor countries with few resources to support even the most promising 
public policies. Most exhibit high levels of both economic and political inequality; 
some still have autocratic regimes in which insiders use their political power to 
extract economic rents by restricting market entry; others have leaders who for 
their political survival depend upon the support of entrenched economic insiders. 
These conditions ensure powerful opposition to the meaningful implementation 
of any competition law. And many jurisdictions have enacted their first 
competition law or established a regulatory agency for its implementation while 
also attempting the difficult task of democratizing their political systems or 
liberalizing their economies. 
Additional challenges arise from economic structures or expectations, held 
by elites and sometimes large parts of the population, that are antithetical to a 
market economy: In many of the new competition law jurisdictions, the state 
retains a large ownership stake in many industries or is still expected to guide 
outputs and inputs of the private sector. Moreover, in a number of these 
jurisdictions, corruption is rampant in the executive branch, and the judiciary is 
far from independent, contributing to generally poor rule of law and limited 
access to justice. And even before adding the regulation of market competition 
to the tasks assigned to their public administrations, many of the recent 
competition law adopters suffered from weak bureaucratic capacity. 
Recent scholarship has called attention to many of these conditions. It has 
advanced our understanding of the serious challenges they present to the 
effectiveness of competition law and policy in developing countries.4 
 
 3.  Büthe & Minhas, supra note 1. See also Tim Büthe & Cindy Cheng, The Effect of Competition 
Law on Innovation: A Cross-National Statistical Analysis, in A STEP AHEAD: COMPETITION POLICY FOR 
SHARED PROSPERITY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH 183–220 (Washington: World Bank & OECD, 
Conference ed. 2016) (detailing the timing and the often unfavorable context of competition law 
adoption). 
 4.  See, e.g., ARMANDO E. RODRIGUEZ & ASHOK MENON, THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION POLICY: 
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Some young competition jurisdictions in the developing world, however, 
appear to have overcome these challenges. Though their records so far are short, 
some agencies seem to have succeeded in building substantial analytical capacity 
and establishing considerable autonomy. And in a number of cases, they appear 
to have become highly effective in dismantling private and public barriers to 
competition in their countries, contributing to development and other goals of 
these societies.5 
A suitably implemented competition law and policy holds much promise. 
Competition is necessary for the tremendous potential benefits of a market 
economy to be achieved—including economic growth and innovation that leads 
to greater variety, increased quality, and/or lower price—and makes it more 
likely that those benefits are widely shared. At the same time, empowering a 
government agency to engage in highly consequential market intervention may 
leave everyone worse off if those powers are abused or exercised incompetently. 
So there is much at stake in understanding what makes competition law and 
policy effective. The articles in this symposium seek to explain the variation in 
trajectories after the initial adoption of a competition law, focusing on two 
questions: 
First, why has the adoption of a competition law and the establishment of a 
competition agency succeeded in bringing into existence a regulatory agency with 
substantial analytical capacity and considerable capability to dismantle private 
and public barriers to competition in some countries, while in others it has largely 
failed to do so? 
Second, what are the conditions under which competition law and policy are 
effective in contributing to broader goals, such as development, equality, or 
economic and political liberalization? 
Prior to exploring these questions, we first address in part II the meaning of 
“success” and “effectiveness” for competition law and policy. This analysis 
structures the subsequent review of the literature because both impediments and 
conducive conditions are differentially harmful or helpful, depending on what we 
take to be the goals of competition law and policy. Part III then examines 
available explanations for variation in outcomes, summarizing what current 
scholarship considers the most important impediments to the effective 
implementation of competition law and policy in developing countries, but also 
scrutinizing the severity of these impediments. Part IV considers factors that 
 
THE SHORTCOMINGS OF ANTITRUST IN DEVELOPING AND REFORMING ECONOMIES (2010) (providing 
an incisive study of the challenges presented by recent competition law policy developments); ECONOMIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW 
(Michal S. Gal et al. eds., 2015); COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. 
Cheng & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013). 
 5.  See William Kovacic & Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Lifecycles of Competition Systems: Explaining 
Variation in the Implementation of New Regimes 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016 for a brief 
discussion of several successful cases (some also discussed in other articles in this symposium), as well as 
a discussion of why it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the trajectory of a country’s competition 
regime during the first twenty to twenty-five years. 
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should make a competition policy more likely to succeed, focusing on conducive 
domestic and international political conditions. It examines inter alia the 
importance and limits of political independence of competition agencies—an 
issue that is generally under-theorized in the existing literature.  Here, we suggest 
that “embedded autonomy” may be preferable to formalistic independence. Part 
V provides a brief preview of the other essays in the symposium. 
II 
EFFECTIVENESS AND SUCCESS OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY: 
WHAT IS IT?  HOW CAN WE ASSESS IT? 
What constitutes “success”—and conversely, what constitutes “failure”—in 
the realm of competition law and policy?  The answer to this question provides 
the lens through which competition law and policy are assessed. Yet, empirical 
work has tended to answer the question only implicitly, for instance by examining 
whether measures of competition law and policy have a significant positive 
impact on indicators of aggregate economic growth, inward foreign investment 
flows, democracy, or corruption.6 Answering this important question only 
implicitly (and sometimes driven by data availability), however, is neither 
conceptually nor theoretically satisfying. Instead, answering the question 
explicitly and deductively must start with the goals of competition law and policy. 
A complete review of the long-standing debates over the proper goals of 
competition law and policy is beyond the scope of this paper.7 But a 
comprehensive review also is not necessary here. Instead, we begin by observing 
that scholars of competition law and policy generally agree that its goals are to 
foster competition whenever markets are used as an allocation mechanism8 and 
to safeguard market competition against anti-competitive practices such as 
cartels and collusion and against the abuse of market power. 
  
 
 6.  See Serdar Dalkir, A Quantitative Evaluation of Effectiveness and Efficacy of Competition 
Policies Across Countries, in 2 POLITICS TRIUMPHS ECONOMICS?  POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
226 (Pradeep S. Mehta & Simon Evenett eds., 2009) (evaluating the effectiveness of competition laws by 
their impact on a country’s score on the World Economic Forum’s domestic competition index and levels 
of foreign direct investment inflows); Niels Petersen, Antitrust Law and the Promotion of Democracy and 
Economic Growth, 9 COMPETITION L. & ECON. 593 (2013) (assessing the impact of competition laws on 
levels of GDP per capita, economic growth and levels of democracy); Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt, 
Lending a Hand to the Invisible Hand? Assessing the Effects of Newly Enacted Competition Laws (Feb. 
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (exploring the effects of competition laws on economic growth, 
investment, total factor productivity, and perceived levels of corruption). 
 7.  For a recent collection, capturing many facets of these debates, see THE MAKING OF 
COMPETITION POLICY:  LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp 
eds., Oxford University Press 2013). 
 8.  Many would add that the goals include promoting the use of markets over other modes of 
allocation, but we consider this a theoretically separate question. We also note Schumpeter’s classic 
insight that extreme levels of competition might eventually become detrimental rather than beneficial 
for, for example, innovation. For a discussion, see Büthe & Cheng, supra note 3. 
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But what does this mean concretely? What steps should be taken in pursuit 
of these general goals and how might we measure whether those goals have been 
achieved? Deriving specific operational objectives or measures of success from 
the general goals of competition law and policy is difficult. Part of the difficulty 
arises from the lack of a precise, widely agreed-upon definition of “market 
competition,” even in economics, despite the centrality of the concept to that 
discipline, which generally prides itself on its near-universally shared priors.9 We 
therefore structure the discussion in the remainder of this part of the paper 
around more specific operationalized objectives of competition law and policy, 
namely: (a) efficiency, (b) human development, (c) private sector rivalry,             
(d) rivalry vis-à-vis the state, (e) a distinctive “culture of competition,” and           
(f) economic and political freedom. 
A. Efficiency 
Under the influence of the Chicago School and its strictly economic approach 
to antitrust/competition law and policy, maximizing consumer welfare became in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s the predominant operational goal of competition 
law and policy in the United States—and, after some time and to a variable 
extent, in many other countries, too.10 Consumer welfare as the ultimate, 
rhetorically emphasized goal, however, quickly gave way to efficiency as the 
actual operational goal.11 Efficiency as a proxy for consumer welfare simplifies 
the required economic analysis, but can only be justified as long as the 
assumption can be maintained that efficiency gains will be passed on to 
consumers—sufficiently so that the expected efficiency gains for consumers will 
 
 9.  See Stephen Martin, Globalization and the Natural Limits of Competition, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF COMPETITION 4, 5–11 (Manfred Neumann & Jürgen Weigand eds., 2d 
ed. 2012) (documenting diverse definitions of competition in the economics literature, such as rivalry, 
absence of barriers to entry and exit, as a selection mechanism, and as the absence of monopoly); Paul J. 
McNulty, A Note on the History of Perfect Competition, 75 J. POL. ECON. 395 (Aug. 1967) (discussing the 
difference—and fundamental incompatibility—between Adam Smith’s view of competition and the 
definition of perfect competition developed and refined by nineteenth and twentieth century 
economists); George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1 (Feb. 
1957) (giving a historical account of the definition of competition, and arguing for the necessity of the 
concept to evolve with economic theory); John Vickers, Concepts of Competition, 47 OXFORD ECON. 
PAPERS 1, 3, 4–7 (Jan. 1995) (noting that competition has taken on various meanings and interpretations, 
and discussing the historical development of the concept). The more readily understood notion of perfect 
competition is too idealized to be analytically useful here, as it would render any deviation from an 
economy of atomistic individuals impermissible, which would imply trying to prohibit or prevent all 
institutionalized relationships between economic actors, even though such institutions are crucial for any 
economy with a substantial division of labor, because they provide for stability and predictability beyond 
individual transactions. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (Nov. 
1937); VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall &  David Soskice eds., 2001). 
 10.  DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION, 142 
(2010). 
 11.  This occurred already in the early works by Chicago School proponents, such as Robert H. Bork, 
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & ECON. ECONOMICS 7, 12, 30 (1966). 
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more than outweigh the expected risk of consumer welfare losses.12 Efficiency as 
an operational goal of competition policy therefore requires careful 
consideration of  whether and to what extent firms have incentives to pass on 
their efficiency gains.13 
Efficiency as the operational goal implies prioritizing punishing and 
preventing the anti-competitive practices that cause the greatest efficiency losses. 
It has been widely understood to call, above all, for antitrust enforcement against 
cartels, especially price-fixing and market-allocating agreements among 
ostensible competitors. Such anti-competitive agreements so clearly result in 
efficiency losses that many countries’ competition laws make them per se 
violations14 with a trend toward increased criminalization.15 Beyond antitrust 
enforcement against clearly anti-competitive horizontal agreements, however, 
efficiency as an operational goal requires often complex economic (and political–
economic) analyses to distinguish practices and transactions that should be 
punished or prevented from practices and transactions that seem anti-
competitive but might in fact yield efficiency gains.16 
The Chicago School’s claim that efficiency maximization is, or should be, the 
only legitimate operational goal of competition law and policy remains contested 
in many countries17—including even the United States.18 The claim that efficiency 
 
 12.  Efficiency gains usually accrue to producers, for example, from greater economies of scale in the 
case of mergers. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
925, 927, 929, 942–944 (Apr. 1979). 
 13.  Strikingly, this need for considering the political–economic strategic incentives is still often 
ignored in antitrust analyses, even though a reduction in market competition reduces exactly these 
incentives—as readily shown by game theory, which has otherwise become a staple of competition 
analysis. 
 14.  Evidence that a cartel agreement existed is thus sufficient for finding participating companies in 
violation of the law, without any need for an enforcement agency to provide an analysis of the economic 
effects. 
 15.  See Gregory C. Shaffer, Nathaniel H. Nesbitt & Spencer Weber Waller, Criminalizing Cartels: 
A Global Trend?, in COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW 301, 302 (John Duns, Arlen Duke & Brendan 
Sweeney eds., 2015). 
 16.  Such analyses are required because efficiency as the goal of competition policy implies allowing 
firms to invoke efficiency gains not only for, for example, vertical agreements with ambiguous welfare 
effects (such as between a producer and a distributor or retailer), but also as a defense for transactions 
that may appear prima facie anti-competitive, such as horizontal mergers. See David J. Gerber, Adapting 
the Role of Economics in Competition Law: A Developing Country Dilemma, in ECONOMIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW 
248, 251 (Michal S. Gal et al. eds., 2015). 
 17.  This contestation has been documented inter alia by MAHER M. DABBAH, INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW, passim (2010); Gerber, supra note 16, at 205–269. 
 18.  See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT 
THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 77, 79–80 
(Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (criticizing the narrow view of efficiency adopted by the Chicago school for 
supressing innovative challengers, and paradoxically stiffling efficiency); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. 
Lande, The Chicago School’s Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, Not Efficiency, in 
HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 89 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (arguing that congressional intent and 
recent case law point to protecting the welfare of consumers as the primary goal of antitrust, rather than 
efficiency). 
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gains should be generally available as a defense for anti-competitive structures or 
practices is similarly contested. It is not necessary, however, to accept these 
claims in order to accept efficiency maximization or efficiency gains as one 
operational goal of competition law and policy. 
Accepting increased efficiency as an operationalized goal of competition law 
and policy implies that increases in production efficiency, allocation efficiency, 
or dynamic efficiency can serve as measures of success—insofar as the increases 
are attributable to competition law and policy. 
B. Economic And Human Development 
Many scholars and practitioners argue that increasing efficiency must not be 
the only goal of competition law and policy—and that this goal might even be 
misguided for relatively poor countries that are still in the early stages of 
industrialization, maintain large agricultural sectors, and use few post-industrial 
services. To be sure, protecting inefficient producers may only postpone painful 
yet ultimately necessary adjustments at a potentially substantial loss in economic 
welfare. Exposing inefficient producers to more efficient competitors without 
limits or assistance, however, amounts to a kind of shock therapy that can cause 
unnecessary losses of income and productivity—problems exacerbated by the 
minimalist or entirely absent welfare states in many developing countries.19 Such 
shock therapy can intensify poverty and inequality and may even reduce the 
number of competitors to the point of reducing the overall level of competition 
in the economy. Moreover, if it brings about massive socio-economic dislocation, 
a purely efficiency-oriented policy risks undercutting the political support for 
pro-market reforms, even if those reforms promise substantial long-term 
benefits. Accordingly, a number of scholars argue that developing countries 
should be free to use competition law and policy to pursue their varying economic 
and non-economic developmental needs.20 
Including economic growth and development among the goals of antitrust is 
appealing, and all else equal, a developing country should surely implement its 
competition laws in ways that foster rather than delay or impede development. 
Growth and development as such, however, are usually too far removed from 
specific policymaking decisions to yield operational guidance for competition 
agencies.21 Moreover, aggregate economic growth as a measure of competition 
 
 19.  See NITA RUDRA, GLOBALIZATION AND THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: WHO REALLY GETS HURT? (2008); Erik Wibbels, Dependency Revisited: International 
Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World, 60 INT’L ORG. 433, 438, (2009) 
(documenting the underveloped social safety net in many developing countries). 
 20.  Some also point out that during the early decades of their competition laws, today’s 
industrialized countries used those laws in pursuit of a wide variety of goals. See, e.g., Aditya 
Bhattacharjea, Who Needs Antitrust? Or, Is Developing-Country Antitrust Different? A Historical-
Comparative Analysis, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 52, 53 (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. 
Cheng & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013). 
 21.  See Simon J. Evenett, Would Enforcing Competition Law Compromise Industrial Policy 
Objectives?, in COMPETITION POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA 47 (Douglas H. Brooks & Simon J. 
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policy success is problematic given the considerable uncertainty around any point 
predictions from even sophisticated contemporary models of economic growth, 
which would constitute the counterfactual no-competition-policy baseline against 
which growth in the presence of competition policy would need to be assessed.22 
We therefore turn to two more specific proposals for implementing a pro-
development competition policy. 
Bhattarcharjea, drawing on the broader notion of human (rather than “just” 
economic) development, suggests that competition law enforcement and policy 
in developing countries should focus on “sectors that directly impinge on the 
well-being of the poor, in particular essential consumer goods, agriculture [and 
its inputs] and health care.”23 And he argues that developing country agencies 
should initially focus on disclosing and alleviating concrete local impediments to 
the operation of competitive markets. Such a strategy is promising because it: 
allows new agencies to build technical capacity by solving relatively tractable 
problems; enables them to build popular support for competition policy through 
actions that yield clear benefits for domestic market participants; and gives the 
agency time to develop transgovernmental linkages with their counterparts in 
other countries before going after the transnational cartels that often ruthlessly 
target developing countries.24 These arguments suggest that the sectoral 
composition and geographic distribution of implementation and enforcement 
efforts may serve as initial measures of success, until it becomes possible to assess 
whether reductions in local distortions and benefits for the poor are indeed 
materializing. 
Fox goes further, both in conceptualizing development as an operational goal 
of competition policy and in suggesting specific foci for competition policy 
implementation. Pointing out that severe inequalities in education and access to 
capital create highly consequential barriers to entry, she suggests that a 
competition policy that seeks to foster equality of opportunity to partake in the 
market and share in its benefits must include measures to overcome such 
inequality or at least its effects.25 From this perspective, competition law and 
policy are successful if they contribute to actual increases in market participation 
from previously marginalized or excluded segments of the population, and could  
  
 
Evenett eds., 2005) (noting the difficulty of deriving policy guidance based on agreeing that competition 
policies should be “pro-growth”). 
 22.  See P.A.M. Jacobs & Simon van Norden, Why Are Initial Estimates of Productivity Growth So 
Unreliable?, 47 J. MACROECONOMICS 200 (2016); V.V. Chari, Patrick J. Kehoe & Ellen R. McGrattan, 
New Keynesian Models: Not Yet Useful for Policy Analysis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 14313, 2008). 
 23. See Bhattacharjea, supra note 20, at 53. 
 24. Id. at 61. 
 25.  Eleanor M. Fox, Competition, Development, and Regional Integration: In Search of a 
Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 273, 275, 281–83, 285 (Josef Drexl, et al. eds., 2011). 
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be considered at least partly successful to the extent that they measurably reduce 
the barriers to entry. 
C.   Unleashing Rivalry In The Private Sector: Identifying Impediments And 
Fostering Competition 
Now consider “unleashing rivalry”26 in the market as an objective in itself. 
This widely acknowledged goal of competition law and policy may be worth 
pursuing even for a jurisdiction that lacks the enforcement capability to ensure 
efficiency gains or a positive contribution to economic or human development in 
each particular case. 
Before a competition agency can try to punish or prevent anti-competitive 
practices through law enforcement or other measures, it needs to identify or 
detect such threats. This ability to identify impediments to market competition 
should be treated as conceptually and practically distinct from the ability to 
remove or reduce such impediments. As Nelson noted in his incisive comment on 
Posner’s depiction of the Chicago School of antitrust thought: “[i]t may be easier 
to identify warts than to perform surgery that does not leave scars or have other 
nasty side effects.”27 
Identifying impediments to market competition requires capacity building28 
to allow the competition agency to undertake the necessary economic, legal, and 
possibly political analyses. This capacity is crucial because merely undertaking 
and publishing the market analyses and disclosing deficiencies in market 
competition may go a long way toward unleashing rivalry in the private sector 
before any resources have been devoted to competition law enforcement.29 
Where information about profitable business opportunities is not readily 
available, merely identifying industries where prices exceed competitive levels, 
for instance, can unleash rivalry because it will encourage market entry by 
economic agents seeking profitable opportunities.30 Where market entry is 
prevented by seemingly prohibitive structural impediments—such as when 
bottlenecks in the distribution network render an otherwise competitive industry 
oligopolistic—explicitly identifying the barriers to entry encourages 
technological or political innovation to overcome them.31 And where market 
 
 26.  We borrow the term from the title of a 2009 report: COMPETITION TRIBUNAL SOUTH AFRICA 
& COMPETITION COMMISSION SOUTH AFRICA, UNLEASHING RIVALRY: TEN YEARS OF 
ENFORCEMENT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMPETITION AUTHORITIES (2009), http://www.compcom 
.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/10year.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5HJ-UDRF]. 
 27.  Richard R. Nelson, Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 952 (1979) 
(cautioning that “this does not mean that a steady alert and occasional operation are not called for”). 
 28.  See infra part IV, for further discussion of what such capacity building entails. 
 29.  See infra part II.D for a discussion of policy priorities when market analyses identify laws, 
regulations, or the actions of public bodies as the key impediments to competition. 
 30.  The same logic applies, a fortiori, if a competition agency’s analyses can pin-point the specific 
stage(s) of a given product’s value chain that are the main source of the supra-competitive prices. 
 31.  In Kenya, for instance, large numbers of dairy farmers, including tens of thousands of 
smallholder milk producers, should ensure a highly competitive market for milk and related products. 
See, e.g., STELLA WAMBUGU, LILIAN KIRIMI, & JOSEPH OPIYO, PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS AND 
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competition is thwarted by deliberate anti-competitive practices—such as when 
a nationally dominant firm abuses and maintains its market power by threatening 
price wars against any new market entrants—public disclosure might, like a 
naming-and-shaming strategy, encourage self-correction, or at least discourage 
others from engaging in similar anti-competitive conduct. 
Accepting “unleashing rivalry” and hence the identification of impediments 
as a fundamental operational goal of competition law and policy implies that 
capacity building itself may initially be a sensible measure of a competition 
policy’s success. But in line with Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos’s notion of 
competition agency lifecycles, different metrics are required later.32 Once an 
agency has attained the requisite analytical capacity, the actual conduct and 
publication of analyses identifying impediments to market competition (and 
estimating the material consequences) should serve as the measure of 
effectiveness, particularly in an agency’s first decade or two. Only once such 
practices are well-established would it seem reasonable to assess a competition 
agency’s pursuit of unleashing rivalry by examining whether or not potential 
market entrants actually enter the market when it is profitable to do so. 
D. Unleashing Rivalry Vis-à-Vis The State: Changes In Law And Public Policy 
As important as it is to unleash rivalry in the private sector, it is often “the 
state [that most] harms competition,”33 including through its rules governing 
markets, ad hoc policy decisions, preferential conditions for state-owned and 
directed enterprises, and government-granted monopolies. And as Fox and 
Healey point out, such problems are especially prevalent in developing 
countries.34 
Competition advocacy targeting anti-competitive laws and public policies is 
increasingly recognized as a distinct but very important part of competition 
policy.35 As defined by the International Competition Network, advocacy refers 
 
PERFORMANCE OF DAIRY FARMING IN KENYA (2011). But milk processing facilities are few and far 
between, creating a severe bottleneck in conjunction with technological constraints such as a lack of a 
stable electricity supply in many rural areas and a transportation infrastructure that is sufficiently weak 
that, for many farmers, only one processing facility is within realistic reach. Diederik de Boer & Jackson 
Langat, Dairy Clustering in Kenya, in DIGGING DEEPER: INSIDE AFRICA’S AGRICULTURAL, FOOD AND 
NUTRITIONAL DYNAMICS 113, 129, 131, 133 (2013). This has allowed three processors to dominate the 
formal market for pasteurized milk. As a result, Kenyan consumers continue to pay substantially more 
for pasteurized milk than consumers in neighboring countries even while the dominant processors have 
pushed down the prices they pay to producers by twenty-five percent over the last few years. Muchemi 
Wachira, Farmers Want Dairy Board to Set Prices of Raw Milk, BUS. DAILY AFR. (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Farmers-want-dairy-board-to-set-prices-of-raw-
milk/-/539550/2224552/-/t5ls7sz/-/index.html [https://perma.cc/3S58-WG9V] 
 32.  See generally Kovacic & Lopez-Galdos, supra note 5 (suggesting an agency’s effectiveness 
should be measured using different metrics at different points in its “lifecycle”).  
 33.  Eleanor M. Fox & Deborah Healey, When the State Harms Competition: The Role for 
Competition Law, 79 ANTITRUST L. J. 769, 775–95 (2014). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Marco Botta, Does the EU Competition Law Model Satisfy the Needs of the Emerging 
Economies? Lessons from the Countries Without a “Carrot”, in FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC 
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to “activities conducted by the competition agency related to the promotion of a 
competitive environment by means of non-enforcement mechanisms, mainly 
through its relationships with other governmental entities and by increasing 
public awareness of the benefits of competition.”36 In developing countries, 
advocacy vis-à-vis legislatures and parts of the executive branch with rulemaking 
or market-regulating powers should therefore be particularly important. 
Accepting the importance of advocacy vis-à-vis the state or governmental 
bodies as a key element of competition policy in developing countries implies 
that the conduct of well-prepared advocacy work targeting public actors might 
already be considered an indication of agency success. In fact, during a 
competition regime’s initial stages, if its competition law originally did not permit 
advocacy, the mere incorporation of provisions allowing or prescribing advocacy 
work—or the legislature’s decision to allocate additional resources for 
advocacy—may initially serve as a measure of success. Once an agency is well 
established, success should be measured according to the actual reduction of 
governmental impediments to market competition.37 
E. Fostering a Culture Of Competition 
There are no markets in the Hobbesian “state of nature” where clubs are 
trumps.38 Markets in which arm’s-length, voluntary transactions coordinate 
behavior well enough to foster sustained economic development require a dense 
web of supportive formal and informal social institutions. Such institutions 
usually take a long time to develop39—an insight that underpins Rodriguez and 
Menon’s argument for why even well-implemented antitrust laws are likely to fail 
in many developing countries.40 Among those supportive social institutions is 
arguably a “culture of competition,” which, following the ordo-liberal idea that  
  
 
DEVELOPMENT IN EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS 2251, 2262 (Karolina Podstawa & Laura Puccio eds., 
2012); William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition 
Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 403, 450 (1997); William E. Kovacic, The Role of Non-Litigation 
Strategies: Advocacy, Reports and Studies as Instruments of Competition Policy, in HANDBOOK OF 
RESEARCH IN TRANS-ATLANTIC ANTITRUST 541, 542 (Philip Marsden ed., 2006); Armando E. 
Rodriguez & Malcolm B. Coate, Competition Poliy in Transition Economies: The Role of Competition 
Advocacy, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 365, 367–69 (1997). 
 36.  ADVOCACY WORKING GROUP, ADVOCACY AND COMPETITION POLICY 25 (2002), http://www. 
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc358.pdf [https://perma.cc/23ZN-8URS]. 
 37.  Keeping in mind that the appropriate counterfactual for assessing any reduction should be the 
level of such impediments that would have been observed in the absence of competition advocacy which 
may or may not be a situation we actually get to observe. 
 38.  See THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE (1642); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651) (introducing his 
notion of the state of nature). 
 39.  See generally JERRY F. HOUGH & ROBIN GRIER, THE LONG PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT:  
BUILDING MARKETS AND STATES IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND, SPAIN, AND THEIR COLONIES 
(2015). 
 40.  See generally A.E. Rodriguez & Ashok Menon, The Causes of Competition Agency 
Ineffectiveness in Developing Countries, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016. 
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competition is foundational to a market economy, may be defined as a broad-
based consensus that competition is both generally beneficial and normatively 
desirable.41 
Historical analyses of the development of EU competition law and policy 
often emphasize the fostering of such a culture of competition as one of the EU 
Commission’s most important contributions to reducing pervasive cartelization 
and collusion.42 U.S. regulators and private sector practitioners with a long time 
horizon similarly tend to mention creating and maintaining such a culture as an 
important contribution of U.S. antitrust law and policy.43 To be sure, the 
European Commission’s ability to foster a competition culture in local business 
communities might have depended upon local legal institutions and bureaucratic 
capacity that are lacking in many developing countries.44 But such practical 
impediments, discussed in part III below, do not invalidate the goal. 
As a practical matter, accepting fostering a culture of competition as a goal of 
competition law and policy implies engaging in advocacy targeted towards the 
society at large. It may also call for at least a minimum level of actual enforcement 
to signal that the rules are meaningful. 
In the early years of a new competition regime, merely engaging in targeted 
and appropriate advocacy might be considered a sign of success. But ultimately, 
changes in the expectations of, and normative dispositions toward, market 
competition, if they can be attributed to the competition authority’s efforts, 
should be the key measure of success in creating a culture of competition. 
F. Economic And Political Freedom 
Economic resources can almost always be used to gain influence—in the 
market and beyond. It is therefore hardly surprising that the inherently political 
character of highly concentrated economic power has been central to debates 
over competition law and policy from the beginning. That high concentrations of 
economic power are inimical to economic and political freedom was a prominent 
theme in Senate debates over the bills that eventually became the U.S. Sherman 
 
 41.  See FRANZ BÖHM, WALTER EUCKEN & HANS GROSSMAN-DOERTH, THE ORDO MANIFESTO 
OF 1936 (1936), reprinted in THE MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES 
254, 265 (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp eds., 2013) (arguing for the centrality of competition 
to a market economy, not just for achieving economic efficiency but also for preserving economic and 
political freedom). 
 42.  See, e.g., Stephen Wilks, Agencies, Networks, Discourses and the Trajectory of European 
Competition Enforcement. 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 415 (2007) (arguing that the development of a 
competition culture has been a crucial component of the success of the European Commission and the 
European Competition Network). 
 43.  Author’s not for attribution interviews, in Washington, DC (Mar. 27, 2015). See also TONY A. 
FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT BRITIAN AND AMERICA, 1880–1990 
(1992) (arguing that antitrust emerged as a response to the rise of big business, yet also became a political 
and cultural value shaping business strategies and culture in the United States and Great Britain). 
 44.  See Josef Drexl, Economic Integration and Competition Law in Developing Countries, in 
COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 231, 243–46 (Josef 
Drexl, et al. eds., 2011). 
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Act of 1890.45 Moreover, as most explicitly articulated by ordo-liberal 
competition law and policy scholars and practitioners,46 if economic power is 
political power, some restrictions on market concentration may be of 
fundamental importance for the compatibility of political democracy and a 
market economy.47 
Safeguarding economic and political freedom as an operational goal has not 
received much attention in the literature on competition law and policy in 
developing countries, but may be particularly pertinent because many of them 
have only quite recently made the transition to democracy. It underscores the 
continued importance of (some) structuralist market analysis and suggests that 
competition policy may need to be attentive to the broader contextual factors 
that affect the extent and ease with which economic power can be transformed 
into political power. 
Table 1.1 summarizes the discussion above. It serves as a basis for thinking 
more systematically about both well-known and less-analyzed impediments to 








 45.  See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES, 
PART I: THE ANTITRUST LAWS 61–364 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978) (“This bill is a step in the right 
direction, and if it shall the beginning of the end of this system of conspiracies and combinations it will 
be hailed as the dawn of genuine freedom, and if it is not so constructed as to accomplish this purpose, I 
hope that the Senate will so amend it as to make it effective” (p. 77 (citing 20 CONG. REC. S3458 
(statement of Sen. Jones))); “If the concentered [sic] powers of this combination are intrusted [sic] to a 
single man, it is a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government, and should be subject to 
the strong resistance of the State and national authorities” (p. 117 (citing 21 Cong. Rec. S2457 (statement 
of Sen. Sherman)))). 
 46.  See, e.g., FRANZ BÖHM, COMPETITION AND THE FIGHT AGAINST MONOPOLIES: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL RIGHT TO ECONOMIC CONTESTATION AND OF THE LEGAL 
UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC ORDER (1933); Franz Böhm, Democracy and 
Economic Power, in CARTEL AND MONOPOLY IN MODERN LAW: REPORTS ON SUPRANATIONAL AND 
NATIONAL EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN LAW 25 (1961); WALTER EUCKEN, ECONOMIC POWER AND 
ECONOMIC ORDER: EUCKEN’S LONDON LECTURES ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND TWO ESSAYS ON 
ANTI-MONOPOLY POLICY (2001). 
 47.  See Alexander A. Kirshner, Legitimate Opposition, Ostracism, and the Law of Democracy in 
Ancient Athens, 78 J. POL. 1094, 1097–1101 (2015) (discussing the Ancient Athenian practice of ostracism, 
which Kirshner categorizes as an “anti-monopolistic” institution, introduced as part of the Kleisthenic 
reform to safeguard Athenian democracy and repeatedly used against citizens who, having amassed a 
“kingly fortune” in Athens’ market economy, were seen by the citizens as a threat to democratic 
governance; ostracism was the practice of banning a person from the city state for ten years based on an 
annual ballot). See also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of 
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646–648 (Feb. 1998) (drawing parallels between 
competitive markets and democratic politics, and arguing for judicial intervention when dominant 
political parties adopt measures to entrench their position, like dominant firms in markets). 
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Table 1.1 
Defining and Measuring Competition Policy Success 
 
Operational Goal Implementation (Policy Priorities) Possible Measures of 
Effectiveness and Success* 
Efficiency • Antitrust enforcement against 
(punishment and prevention of) anti-
competitive practices that cause clear 
and substantial efficiency losses 
• Implementation guided primarily by 
economic analysis 
• Increases in production efficiency 
• Increases in allocation efficiency 
• Increases in dynamic efficiency 
Development: 
Economic & Beyond 
• Targeting competition law 
enforcement/policy for maximum 
potential benefits to the poor 
• Targeting local distortions of market 
competition 
• Addressing inequality as impediment 
to market entry 
• Sectoral and/or geographic focus 
of competition law/policy 
implementation 
• Reduction in local distortions and 
actual benefits for poor and 
previously excluded/marginalized 
• Long-term: Improved capacity for 
market entry by indigenous 
entrepreneurs 
Unleashing Rivalry 
in the Private Sector 
• Building market-analytical 
capabilities for identifying 
impediments to competition in the 
private sector 
• Capacity building as such (initially) 
• Long-term: Identifying and 
publicizing impediments to market 
competition, incl. anti-competitive 
structures and behavior  
Unleashing Rivalry  
vis-a-vis the State 
• Competition advocacy targeting 
legislative bodies and the parts of the 
executive branch with rulemaking or 
market-regulating powers 
• Legislative authorization and 
funding for advocacy work vis-à-
vis state or governmental bodies 
(initially) 
• Advocacy work targeting state or 
governmental bodies (initially) 
• Long-term: Reduction of 
unnecessary government 
impediments to market 
competition 
Unleashing a Culture 
of Competition 
• Advocacy vis-à-vis the business 
community and society at large 
• Conduct of suitable advocacy work 
targeting economic actors and 
society at large (initially) 
• Long-term: Changes in social 
expectations and normative 
disposition toward market 
competition 
Economic & Political 
Freedom 
• Attentiveness to political–legal 
institutional determinants of the 
political usability of economic power 
• Conditional on such usability: 
Structural analysis of market 
concentration and economic power 
(irrespective of “abuse” thereof) 
• Sensitivity to conditional effect of 
market structure on political 
(in)equality (initially) 
• Long-term: Freedom from private 
economic power 
maintained/expanded 
• Long-term: Nominal political-legal 
equality remains de facto 
meaningful 
 
* All outcome measures are to be read as “… if attributable to competition law and policy,” 
which as a practical matter at a minimum implies: above and beyond increases/decreases that would 
be achieved in the absence of competition law and policy. 
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III 
EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN OUTCOMES (1): 
IMPEDIMENTS TO COMPETITION POLICY EFFECTIVENESS IN            
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The existing literature identifies many obstacles to the effective 
implementation of competition law and policy in developing countries. Such 
obstacles can be grouped into five categories. We specify how each of these 
common conditions of developing countries is said to interfere with the success 
of competition law and policy, especially in relation to the operational goals of 
competition policy discussed in part II. 
A. Resource Constraints 
The most commonly noted characteristic of developing countries’ 
competition policies is a shortage of resources on three levels: financial resources 
for the competition agency; legal and economic expertise within the 
implementation/enforcement agency; and antitrust and economic expertise 
within the judiciary. These resource constraints affect a competition agency’s 
ability to pursue or achieve all six of the goals identified in part II, though most 
severely the pursuit of efficiency due to its greater reliance on sophisticated 
economic analyses and law enforcement. It may be possible, however, to 
overcome these constraints in a number of respects. 
1. Financial Resources 
Staff salaries usually constitute a competition agency’s greatest expenditure 
(followed by the costs of administrative support and information technology 
equipment).48 A shortage of financial resources thus translates to a shortage of 
staff and inability to hire additional, specialized outside experts. This affects the 
agency’s ability to pursue any of the previously identified goals by undermining 
its ability to carry out the legal, economic, and political analyses that are required 
if the agency is pursuing an efficiency-maximizing competition policy, trying to 
target competition policy such that it is maximally supportive of the country’s 
development needs, or seeking to identify public and private impediments to 
market competition. Lack of financial resources also constrains an agency’s 
ability to engage in advocacy work to foster a culture of competition. While all 
possible goals are thus affected by financial resource constraints, enforcement-
focused approaches should be particularly severely hampered because of the 
additional costs of on-site investigations and staff-intensive trial preparation and 
performance.49 
 
 48.  See Glob. Competition Rev., Rating Enforcement 2016, Analysis: Part 2, GLOB. COMPETITION 
REV. (2016), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/surveys/article/41412/analysis-part-2 [https://perma.cc/ 
6FKA-79BH] (showing that out of thirty-nine competition agencies surveyed, thirty allocate more than 
fifty percent of their budget to staff salaries, and fourteen allocate seventy-five percent or more of their 
budget on salaries). 
 49.  See Michal S. Gal & Eleanor M. Fox, Drafting Competition Law for Developing Jurisdictions:  
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 2. Expertise in the Agency 
Shortage of expertise, particularly of well-trained competition lawyers and 
economists, impedes both an agency’s ability to appropriately prioritize its 
activities and to enforce its laws and policies. As Gerber points out, this problem 
becomes even more acute when competition agencies choose a more economics-
based approach to competition law, that is, when they pursue an efficiency-
maximization goal. The sophisticated models needed for evaluating anti-
competitive conduct and the stringent data requirements for the pursuit of 
efficiency require higher computational and staff resources.50 
 3. Expertise in the Judiciary 
For enforcement-focused competition regimes in which the agency must 
bring and win its cases before a judge, the judiciary’s lack of familiarity—not just 
with antitrust economics but also with the often recently adopted competition 
law—can be a very serious problem. In Mexico, for instance, the lack of expertise 
in the courts crippled early years of competition policy enforcement when district 
judges reversed agency decisions in several crucial cases.51 In Chile, the Supreme 
Court used its broad powers of review to decrease fines imposed by the 
competition agency, in one case to less than $100.52 Furthermore, a lack of 
expertise in the judiciary can cause broader problems, such as an excessive 
backlog of cases that renders judicial review of competition agency decisions 
meaningless. Such delays enable anti-competitive actors to avoid judgments by 
utilizing the slow-moving appeals process. In Turkey, for example, delays of up 
to four years in the judicial review process often rendered the agency-imposed 
fines negligible due to high inflation rates.53 
In sum, resource constraints are a real problem. Competition agencies in 
developing countries frequently have staffs so small that it is literally impossible 
for them to carry out all of their assigned tasks.54 However, developing country 
agencies may be less unique in this regard than they seem. Few, if any, 
competition agencies have come to life fully formed and well-resourced. The EU 
 
Learning from Experience, in ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS: THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW 296, 311–314 (Michal S. Gal et al., eds., 2015) (discussing the 
implications of human and financial resource shortages for the enforcement of competition law in 
developing countries); Michal S. Gal, When the Going Gets Tight: Institutional Solutions When Antitrust 
Enforcement Resources Are Scarce, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 417, 423–425 (2010) (describing the implications 
of resource scarcity on the enforcement of competition law, and discussing possible solutions). 
 50.  Gerber, supra note 16, at 253. 
 51.  ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN MEXICO: AN 
OECD PEER REVIEW 45 (2004).  
 52.  Javier Tapia & Santiago Montt, Judicial Scrutiny and Competition Authorities, in THE GLOBAL 
LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW 141, 155 (D. Daniel Sokol & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2012).  
 53.  ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., TURKEY – PEER REVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW 
AND POLICY 41–42 (2005), http://www.oecd.org/turkey/34645128.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY74-EHN6]. 
 54.  See, e.g., Keabetswe Newel, Competition Authority is Understaffed, BUS. WKLY. & REV. (Nov. 
3, 2015), http://www.businessweekly.co.bw/competition-authority-is-understaffed/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7F7Y-DG2C] (discussing the impact of staff shortages on Botswanian Competition Authority’s 
enforcement efforts). 
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Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (originally DG IV) 
illustrates this point well. When first set up—amidst considerable skepticism even 
among those member states who had supported the treaty provisions for a 
supranational competition policy—DG IV had a pitifully small staff. It had no 
meaningful resources beyond the intellectual firepower of the individuals who 
applied for the low-rank, low-prestige positions, mostly out of intrinsic 
commitment but with little prior experience, since none of the member states had 
meaningful competition law enforcement agencies at the national level prior to 
1957. For the first several years, DG IV mostly just conducted market analyses 
to gain the analytical and practical experience needed for its later enforcement 
work. It also built a constituency by making impediments clearly known to 
market participants who could benefit from their removal. And it alerted these 
constituents to the availability of EU-level competition law and policy as a means 
of seeking redress.55 
The EU experience suggests that capacity can (and maybe must) be built 
internally. It also highlights the issue of sequencing, a central component of 
Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos’s argument that an assessment of the trajectory of a 
competition agency is only possible after twenty to twenty-five years. The 
capacity (and political support) for market analysis, advocacy, and law 
enforcement must first be built, preferably in that order, and then rendered 
independent of the charisma of a founding head of the agency, before the 
sustainability of an agency’s success can adequately be evaluated.56 
Matching tasks to available resources can make capacity-building more 
successful. Newly established agencies should, for instance, avoid requiring 
notification and review of all mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures, no matter 
how small. Though sweeping notification requirements may be attractive because 
they usually generate fee income, they can also overwhelm the agency with the 
processing of paperwork alone, leaving no time for analysis and capacity-
building. Even when the aspirations of an agency, as written into the authorizing 
law and implementing regulations, are not matched by budgetary allocations, the 
agency can still recover much ground by effectively setting its own priorities. 
Competition agency experts from developing countries as diverse as Jamaica, 
Egypt, Kenya, and Thailand, for instance, have emphasized the need to balance 
vigorous competition law enforcement with the allocation of scarce resources and 
skilled personnel to other pressing policy problems.57 
  
 
 55.  For details, see Tim Büthe & Gabriel T. Swank, The Politics of Antitrust and Merger Review in 
the European Union:  Institutional Change and Decisions from Messina to 2004 (Harv. Ctr. for Eur. Stud., 
Working Paper No. 142, Dec. 2006). 
 56.  See Kovacic & Lopez-Galdos, supra note 5, at 94–97.  
 57.  See Frank Emmert, Franz Kronthaler & Johannes Stephan, Analysis of Statements Made in 
Favour of and Against the Adoption of Competition Law in Developing and Transition Economies, 
HALLE INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG, SONDERHEFT 45, 56 (2005).  
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Moreover, attrition of skilled staff to the private sector is an even greater 
concern in developing countries than it is in advanced industrialized countries. 
Each year between 2005 and 2015, South Africa’s Competition Commission lost 
more than 18% of its staff on average; the Mexican Federal Competition 
Commission 20%; and the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service more than 
24%.58 Training and integrating new recruits can be a significant burden on an 
agency’s financial and human resources—if the developing country’s competition 
agency is able to replace the lost staff at all. Yet, though attrition can be a real 
problem in the short run, it may be better to view, and more palatable to defend, 
such lost training and manpower as positive spill-over from a public investment 
to the larger economy: if agency training in competition law and policy creates 
transferable skills, it may also earn political support for the agency’s work. 
Finally, even generous funding and staffing do not guarantee success. 
“Effectiveness gaps”—where an agency performs below the expected degree of 
effectiveness given their level of funding and expertise—are widespread.59 
Sometimes, other impediments may be so severe that even a well-funded and 
well-staffed agency cannot make a big difference. More often, however, it seems 
that an unwise use of resources (for political expediency or due to inattention to 
building capacity) explains those effectiveness gaps. 
B. Unsupportive Or Hostile Political–Legal Environment 
A second set of obstacles to effective competition policy enforcement in many 
developing countries is political–legal in nature. We begin with impediments 
rooted in the legal and judicial system, then turn to impediments attributable to 
the broader political environment. 
Many of the developing countries that have adopted competition laws in the 
last twenty-five to thirty years are characterized by weak rule of law and low 
judicial independence. These challenges are often exacerbated by restricted 
“access to justice”60 for those who are not already socio-economically privileged; 
and small businesses as well as potential market entrants are often among the 
marginalized. Such conditions are a significant problem for the enforcement-
focused competition policy in pursuit of economic efficiency (whereas they do 
not have a deductively clear effect on the pursuit of the other objectives of 
competition policy, discussed in part II above): The judiciary usually plays an 
important role as the final arbiter in the enforcement of competition law, even in 
systems where the initial steps in enforcement take place as an administrative 
process within the competition agency. Conditions limiting access to the judiciary 
 
 58.  Authors’ calculations, based on Rating Enforcement 2005–2015, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. 
(2005–2015), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/surveys/archive. For comparison, the average for the 
same period was fourteen percent for the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and five 
percent for Germany’s Cartel Office (and a higher percentage of these departures were due to retirement 
compared to the developing countries). 
 59.  Dalkir, supra note 6, at 238–244. 
 60.  See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX (2015), http://worldjustice 
project.org/rule-of-law-index [https://perma.cc/MRH9-M6TE]. 
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therefore inhibit the likelihood that competition law will be effective in achieving 
socially desirable outcomes. And often-pervasive corruption exacerbates the 
problem by creating uncertainty about the impartiality of competition law 
enforcement whenever suspicion of corruption extends to the judiciary or the 
competition agency. 
Autocratic regimes, weak democracies, and generally high political inequality 
are also common among younger competition regimes. Autocratic regimes in 
particular are often sustained by a close alliance between entrenched economic 
elites in oligopolistic industries and a small group of political insiders. The former 
may be partly a creation of the latter, such as when members of the autocratic 
elite or the armed forces create monopolies and oligopolies in order to 
(re)distribute a larger share of the national income to themselves than they could 
obtain with competitive markets. In weak democracies, diffuse economic 
interests, such as the interests of consumers, also tend to be poorly represented 
or altogether marginalized.61 These inequalities increase the risk of political 
interference in the implementation of the country’s competition law and policy 
in the interest of firms with privileged access to political leaders. And firms with 
market power or exceptional economic resources due to their anti-competitive 
practices are among the most likely to have privileged access. 
Having an unsupportive or even hostile political–legal environment is very 
likely to undermine enforcement-focused, efficiency-maximizing competition 
policies. But severe political inequality can also affect the ability to advance 
development objectives, foster rivalry in an underdeveloped private sector, or 
advance economic freedom through competition policy. These objectives require 
an ability to target competition law and policy to the detriment of insiders, 
making it very likely that those insiders will attempt interference. Advocating 
competition-compatible public policies is also less likely to be successful under 
conditions of high political inequality, because entrenched interests will likely 
pressure legislators or government bodies to prevent changes in laws and policies 
that generate rents for those entrenched interests.62 
In sum, political–legal factors affect the ability of competition law and policy 
to achieve many of its possible goals, possibly severely. To be sure, one might 
argue that the possibility of political intervention is simply an additional reason 
to call for the adoption of a competition policy with a strong advocacy role (vis-
à-vis both public actors and civil society), to be implemented by a competition 
agency with reinforced independence. However, anything more than a marginal 
contribution to democratizing the political system, increasing judicial 
independence, and ending corruption is too much to ask of even the most 
resourceful competition agency. Unlike in the case of resource constraints, 
 
 
 61.  Stephen Weymouth, Competition Politics: Interest Groups, Democracy, and Antitrust Reform in 
Developing Countries, 61 ANTITRUST BULL. 296 (2016). 
 62.  Interference with policies that seek to foster a culture of competition should be unlikely, because 
such policies are much less immediately threatening to entrenched interests. 
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skillful implementation of competition law and policy by itself cannot overcome 
the problem. 
C. Lack Of Competition Culture 
Distrust toward—or at least anxiety regarding—market mechanisms is 
common in many developing countries, and especially in countries that have only 
recently transitioned from either a socialist or a capitalist-yet-state-dominated 
economy to a market economy. Put differently, the normative commitment to 
market competition as the fundamental principle of economic relations is in 
many developing countries weak—among economic elites as well as in society at 
large. 
In developing countries where such a competition culture is lacking, many 
scholars and practitioners consider it one of the most important impediments to 
effective competition law and policy,63 even though it affects most of the 
operationalized goals identified in part II only indirectly. The lack of a 
competition culture can make it harder to find skilled economists and lawyers 
committed to working for an agency whose mission it is to safeguard and foster 
market competition. This in turn makes it more difficult to develop the capacity 
to identify impediments to competitive markets, which undermines the first, 
foundational step toward “unleashing rivalry,” as well as for an efficiency-
oriented competition policy. 
The lack of a competition culture also makes it less likely that competitors, 
customers, and maybe suppliers will turn to the competition agency when they 
encounter direct evidence—or apparent consequences—of suspected anti-
competitive behavior. Such a lack of information from competitors and the 
consuming public is likely to significantly impede the identification of anti-
competitive conduct: Even the U.S. and EU competition agencies, with their 
substantial staffs and sophisticated market-analytical capabilities, rely on formal 
complaints or quiet tip-offs from competitors, customers and consumers, or 
disgruntled former or current employees of firms engaged in anti-competitive 
conduct for some eighty percent of their enforcement actions.64 A dearth of 
supporting information-provision from private actors due to the lack of a 
competition culture therefore can be expected to hamper—indirectly, yet 
seriously—the goal of unleashing rivalry, as well as the pursuit of efficiency. To a 
 
 63.  See, e.g., Allan Fels & Wendy Ng, Rethinking Competition Advocacy in Developing Countries, 
in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 182, 183 (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng & Ioannis 
Lianos eds., 2013) (identifying the need to build competition culture in developing countries, and 
advocating a national competition policy approach similar to the one taken in Australia); David Lewis, 
Embedding a Competition Culture: Holy Grail or Attainable Objective?, in COMPETITION LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT 228, 230–235 (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013) (arguing 
for the need to promote competition culture in countries with new competition regimes, not just among 
private actors but also within the government itself, based on experience of the South African 
Competition Commission, whose success in its first decade in mergers and cartels was overshadowed in 
its second decade by ministerial and judicial intervention into the Commission’s enforcement efforts). 
 64.  Authors’ not for attribution interviews, Brussels and Washington, D.C. 
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lesser extent it may also affect the implementation of a development-oriented 
competition policy and of an advocacy-focused policy targeting the public sector 
and policymakers. 
The lack of a competition culture, moreover, may be expected to impede law 
enforcement, possibly severely, because it makes it less likely that judges accept 
the premise of the competition law, which in turn will impede the enforcement-
focused pursuit of efficiency. A strategy aimed at unleashing rivalry is also likely 
to suffer, because a lack of a competition culture reduces the probability that 
potential competitors will actually enter the market when incumbent firms are 
making supra-competitive profits. 
The most severely detrimental consequence, however, is likely political: 
Without deep-seated support for market competition, the “natural” constituency 
for competition law—composed of groups such as consumers, and producers and 
entrepreneurs facing high entry barriers from existing firms—does not form and 
surely will not become vocal. The lack of a competition culture thus deprives the 
competition agency of advocates and allies in society, which play a helpful 
supporting role for the pursuit of any of the goals discussed in part II but will be 
particularly critical if a competition law and policy is to be used to safeguard 
political and economic freedom. 
In sum, the lack of a competition culture is indirectly, but in important ways, 
detrimental to the achievement of almost all of the goals of competition law and 
policy. In addition, it directly affects competition culture as a goal, requiring 
advocates of competition law and policy to create and nurture such a culture 
rather than maintain and strengthen it. 
The good news is that the lack of a competition culture also is a problem that 
competition agencies can themselves help alleviate. They can do so through a 
competition policy that puts advocacy (vis-à-vis society as much as vis-à-vis 
government agencies) front and center and thus builds a competition culture—
and with it, a supportive political coalition, as Agüero shows in his analysis of the 
development of the Chilean competition regime.65 Recognizing the importance 
of building a competition culture, the World Bank and the International 
Competition Network have recently started a joint program to highlight effective 
competition advocacy programs to help agencies elsewhere learn from successful 
advocacy efforts.66 
D. Institutionally Underdeveloped Markets 
Competition law and policy can only improve the performance of a market 
economy if there actually is a market—a market that, absent anti-competitive 
 
 65.  See generally Francisco Agüero, Chilean Antitrust Policy: Some Lessons Behind Its Success, 79 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016. 
 66.  See WORLD BANK, THE 2015–2016 COMPETITION ADVOCACY CONTEST: HOW TO BUILD A 
CULTURE OF COMPETITION FOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (Oct. 
2015–Jan. 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2015/10/30/the-2015-2016-competition-advocacy-
contest-how-to-build-a-culture-of-competition-for-private-sector-development-and-economic-growth. 
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structures and conduct, is functional. Two types of contextual factors render 
markets too dysfunctional to support an effective competition policy: 
institutional deficiencies, discussed here, and market imperfections created by 
geographical and other physical constraints, discussed in part III.E. 
1. Weak or Poorly Enforced Property And Contract Rights 
For goods and services to be traded in a market, it must be possible to 
meaningfully transfer property rights from one person or firm to another. 
Anything other than a spot transaction requires contractual commitments to be 
meaningful, and therefore usually enforceable.67 
2. Government Directing Economic Activity 
Many developing countries’ economies do not work like true markets because 
the state retains significant ownership stakes in a number of industries. The 
government then uses this ownership to interfere politically in management 
decisions or to direct economic activity to achieve various non-economic 
objectives. Directly regulating competition among rivals through government-
sanctioned monopolies can have a similar effect, as can price controls for 
industries that are not natural monopolies. For instance, the Mexican state 
effectively organized and protected a cartel when its telecommunications 
regulator ordered all Mexican carriers “to set their rates for calls entering Mexico 
at the rate set by the largest firm,” Telmex.68 
3. Exemptions From The Competition Law 
An even more obvious institutional deficiency is created by categorical 
exemptions of state-owned enterprises or government-sponsored monopolies 
from the applicability of the country’s competition law.69 Other exemptions 
remove specific industries or entire sectors (such as agriculture) from the 
authority of the competition agency. In many Latin American countries, 
economic activity equaling more than sixty percent of GDP is exempt from 
antitrust enforcement through exemptions of nationalized strategic activities or 
industries.70 In Mexico, for example, the constitution defines postal services, 
petroleum and other hydrocarbons, nuclear energy and electric power, and other 
sectors as “strategic” and therefore exempt from the application of the country’s 
 
 67.  Contract enforcement can in principle be informal and communal. See AVNER GREIF, 
INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE (2006). 
But as Richman points out, communal enforcement is not compatible with fundamental principles of 
competition law, such as the prohibition on collusive refusal to buy or sell (boycotts). Barak D. Richman, 
Contracts and Cartels: Reconciling Competition and Development Policy, in COMPETITION LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT 155, 164–166 (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013). 
 68.  Fox & Healey, supra note 33, at 772. 
 69.  See, e.g., Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa del Consumidor [Law for the 
Promotion of Competition and Consumer Protection], No. 7474, art. 9 (1994) (Costa Rica).  
 70.  IGNACIO DE LEON, AN INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LATIN 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 50 (2009). 
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competition law.71 In other countries such as Colombia and Venezuela, activities 
as diverse as agriculture, professional sports, labor organizations, and exports 
have been exempted from antitrust laws.72 The larger the share of the country’s 
economy affected by these exemptions, the less likely competition policy is to 
have a notable effect. 
Having institutionally under-developed markets reduces the chances of 
competition policy attaining most of the objectives identified in part II, but it 
affects some more than others. Institutional deficiencies such as the absence of 
well-defined and readily enforceable property and contract rights should make 
an efficiency-oriented competition policy particularly unattainable,73 whereas a 
development-oriented competition policy need not be much impeded by having 
the government direct some economic activity. By contrast, the chances of 
unleashing rivalry in the private sector will be potentially severely diminished, at 
least if institutional deficiencies create great uncertainty about the likelihood of 
commercial success when entering a market, whereas an advocacy-focused 
competition policy that seeks to establish a culture of competition may be 
impeded but can still hold much promise.  Similarly, we would expect a negative 
effect on a competition agency’s ability to “unleash rivalry vis-à-vis the state” 
through advocacy targeting elected officials and government agencies (as well as 
on its ability to pursue a competition policy aimed at safeguarding political and 
economic freedom) if market-based alternative solutions are less available or 
attractive, but such an effect need not be severe. 
Much also will depend upon how sweeping the exemptions are: If a country’s 
competition law can be readily rendered inapplicable by being able to portray the 
anti-competitive conduct in question as necessary due to any other law or due to 
the actions of any government policy (“state action”), it may be hard for a 
competition agency to make much headway. At the same time, this hardly 
suggests the futility of competition law in some general sense, but rather should 
alert us to the deficiencies in a given country’s market-governing rules as 
interacting with the country’s competition regime. 
E. Geographically Or Physically Underdeveloped Markets 
Last but not least, many developing countries have underdeveloped domestic 
markets due to size or geography, poor or limited physical infrastructure 
connecting producers and consumers or traders, or climatic conditions that 
prevent economic actors from using the existing infrastructure to create a single 
domestic market.74 
 
 71.  Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Méxicanos, [CP] art. 28, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DOF] 03-02-1983, últimas reformas 20-12-2013.  
 72.  DE LEON, supra note 70, at 56.  
 73.  Working towards a culture of competition, if successful, should, collaterally, also increase 
support for the strengthening of contract and property rights and would thus alleviate one of the 
underlying problems over time. 
 74.  Gal & Fox, supra note 49, at 307. 
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Size can affect the effectiveness of competition policy in two ways. First, 
domestic markets might have too few potential consumers for a given product or 
service to work like a truly competitive market, even in the absence of anti-
competitive conduct. Size here is partly a matter of numbers, but also a matter of 
the level of economic activity. A country with a large but mostly poor population 
still has only a small market for products for which there is no demand among 
this population. This is why Gal advocates the small-country analogy as apt for 
many markets in developing countries.75 Second, the size of the domestic market 
affects enforcement efforts against international cartels and mergers. Foreign 
firms can easily circumvent a small country’s penalties or conditions by simply 
forgoing access to its market—a problem that motivates, in part, Ralf Michael’s 
proposal in his article for this symposium.76 
In sum, size matters. Even the most brilliantly executed competition policy 
cannot by itself bring about significant improvements in efficiency if the market 
is characterized by structural weaknesses. There also is not much room for 
unleashing rivalry through purely domestic strategies in an economically “small” 
country. The chances of competition policy achieving other goals seem much less 
affected by the size of the market. 
Size, however, is by no means the only pertinent geographic characteristic. 
Neoclassical economics assumes away transportation costs (along with most 
other transaction costs). But for anything except light-weight, high-value goods, 
transportation costs still matter, both domestically and internationally.77 Time 
and again in economic history, the transportation infrastructure has determined, 
and often radically changed, the boundaries of markets.78 Today, innovations in 
information and communications technology, along with new technologies such 
as three-dimensional printing, promise to do the same again without the need to 
transport physical goods.79 For the overwhelming share of most developing 
countries’ economies, however, the extent to which consumers and producers are 
connected by both transportation and communication infrastructures currently 
remains critical to determining the extent of any market. 
The feasibility of transport and communications is, at least in part, a function 
of geography. Mountain ranges, deserts, oceans, and major rivers are formidable 
 
 75.  See Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges 
Faced by Small and Developing Jurisdictions, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L. REV. 1, 12ff, 31–37 (2009). 
 76.  See generally Ralf Michaels, Supplanting Foreign Antitrust, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4. 
2016. 
 77.  David Hummels, Transportation Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of 
Globalization, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 131, 151 (2007) (showing that distance and variations in 
transportation costs still explain a large share of countries’ bilateral trade volumes, even with the 
significant decline in costs of air, land and ocean transport that are documented in the article). 
 78.  See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877–1900 (2000) (detailing the creation of a truly national economy in the United 
States). 
 79.  For a prescient perspective on these developments, see HOW REVOLUTIONARY WAS THE 
DIGITAL REVOLUTION?  NATIONAL RESPONSES, MARKET TRANSITIONS, AND GLOBAL 
TECHNOLOGY (John Zysman & Abraham L. Newman, eds. 2006). 
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barriers to building a transportation infrastructure, often depriving a country of 
a national market and dividing it instead into multiple, smaller jurisdictions. 
Within the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, the left and right banks 
of the Congo form practically unconnected economic spheres for hundreds of 
miles, even though there is commercial traffic along the river.80 In Nepal, the 
majority of the population is estimated to have few, if any, opportunities for 
economic exchange beyond the local barter economy because the mountainous 
geography of rural Nepal turns every valley into a largely separate economic 
entity.81 Climatic conditions in many developing countries can similarly prevent 
the maintenance of a national market: in countries as diverse as Bangladesh, The 
Gambia, Kenya, Nepal, Sudan, and Nicaragua, for instance, a substantial share 
of the country’s roads become unusable for part of each year with the onset of 
rainy season.82 
Do these characteristics of many developing countries’ markets constitute 
insurmountable obstacles to an effective competition policy? Geography and 
climatic conditions surely are hard to change, though even these factors are 
usually less constraining for richer countries, which can afford an infrastructure 
that makes their national markets much less likely to be meaningfully subdivided 
by such conditions. And though the extent to which a country has an 
infrastructure connecting its producers and consumers to each other by creating 
a national-level domestic market is partly a function of resources, it also is a 
matter of political priorities. Similarly, economic size is at least in part a political 
choice rather than a given, as trade openness can greatly extend the size of the 
market,83 especially when accompanied by domestic policies that help connect 
 
 80.  See, e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo, in AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2005–2006 215, 
223–225 (describing in some detail the “dilapidated or inexistent” transportation infrastructure of the 
Democratic Republic Congo). The beginnings of the “reconstruction of infrastructure” have started in 
recent years. See Country Notes: Congo, in AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2014: GLOBAL VALUE 
CHAINS AND AFRICA’S INDUSTRIALIZATION 1f (2014); see also AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 
OECD & UNDP, AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2015: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND SPATIAL 
INCLUSION 76 (2015). 
 81.  World Bank, Feature Story: Connecting Nepal’s Rural Poor to Markets (2009), https://www. 
worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2009/12/17/connecting-nepals-rural-poor-to-markets [https://perma.cc 
/KK42-E8R7] (describing how “Nepal’s rugged terrain prevent[s] people from moving with ease” with 
“some 60% of [its] road network and most rural roads not operable during the rainy season”).  For an 
overview of the disparity of economic condition within the country, see NEPAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 2014 11–24 (2014), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/nepal_nhdr_2014-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DKQ2-PYS7]. 
 82.  See, e.g., José A. Barbero, Logistics Challenges in Central America, in GETTING THE MOST OUT 
OF TRADE AGREEMENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 181, 199 (J. Humberto Lopéz & Rashmi Shankar eds., 
2011).  
 83.  See generally SETH K. JOLLY, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE RISE OF REGIONALIST 
PARTIES (2015) (showing how the highly institutionalized supra-national economic integration of the EU 
has increased the viability of political movements for autonomy and “national” independence within 
several of the member states of the EU); Alberto Alesina, Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, 
Economic Integration and Political Disintegration, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1276, 1277 (2000) (developing a 
formal model that endogenizes the number and size of countries as a function of openness to trade); 
David A. Lake & Angela O’Mahony, The Incredible Shrinking State: Explaining Change in the Territorial 
Size of Countries, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 699, 719–20, (2004) (documenting and explaining the increase 
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domestic producers and consumers to international markets—though it should 
not be assumed that international integration of product or financial markets 
alleviates, rather than exacerbates, problems that need to be addressed by 
competition policy.84 In contrast to some of the other obstacles faced by 
competition regimes, this cannot be alleviated by skillful competition regulators: 
Competition law and policy themselves seem unlikely to affect the broader policy 
priorities that are at issue here. That said, the impact of these obstacles on the 
likely effectiveness of a development-oriented competition policy with its 
primarily local focus, as well as on advocacy-based policies or on the benefits of 
being attuned to concerns about political and economic freedom should be 
modest. And where public policy shows a clear commitment to minimizing the 
effects of these seemingly immutable constraints, competition policy may yet 
hold much promise. 
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in the average size of states in the 19th and decrease in the 20th century). 
 84.  For an overview, see Tim Büthe, The Politics of Market Competition: Trade and Antitrust in a 
Global Economy, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 213 (Lisa L. 
Martin ed., 2014). 
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IV 
EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN OUTCOMES (2): 
POLITICAL SUPPORT AS A CONDUCIVE CONDITION FOR EFFECTIVE 
COMPETITION POLICY 
Variation in outcomes is not only explained by variation in the impediments 
to competition policy effectiveness discussed in part III.  It is also a function of 
variation in conducive conditions, among which we believe the following three to 
be particularly important, building on previous theoretical literature as well as 
case studies.  They are three distinct elements of the political context, in which 
competition law and competition agencies operate. 
A. Domestic Political Allies 
The presence of domestic allies who are supportive of the competition agency 
appears to have been an important factor in several successful cases. The 
availability of such allies is in part a function of the country’s regime type. For 
instance, democratization gives a voice to previously excluded groups such as 
consumers and small businesses, who are natural allies for competition agencies’ 
efforts to curb the power of dominant economic actors that prevent newer firms 
from entering into markets.85 In addition, a vibrant civil society can help a 
competition agency succeed in safeguarding economic and political freedom, 
establishing a culture of competition, and spurring rivalry in the private sector. 
Non-governmental organizations—such as the India-based Consumer Unity and 
Trust Society, and the Instituto Brasileiro de Estuos de Concorrência, Consumo 
e Comércio Internacional in Brazil—for instance educate the public and 
contribute to national debates on competition policy.86 A competition agency 
may also find allies among other regulatory agencies and different parts of the 
government and the bureaucracy when their interests coincide in pursuit of 
regulating the country’s competitive process. Consumer protection agencies, 
such as those in Mexico and Chile (where these agencies are separate from the 
countries’ competition agencies), have aided competition law enforcement by 
providing information to competition agencies or by bringing class action suits to 
claim damages on behalf of consumers against dominant firms or cartel members, 
thus augmenting the deterrent effect of fines imposed by the competition 
agencies.87 Cooperative relations between different government agencies may 
 
 85.  Weymouth, supra note 61, at 5. 
 86.  Albert A. Foer, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of 
Competition Law, in MORE COMMON GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 279, 287 
(Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2009). 
 87.  In México, PROFECO (Federal Attorney’s Office of Consumer) helped initiate an investigation 
into a national poultry cartel by providing information it gathered through monitoring price levels in the 
markets. See COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, ANNUAL REPORT 2012 60 (2012), 
http://189.206.114.203/images/stories/Publicaciones/Informesanuales/Annual_Report2012.pdf. The 
Chilean SERNAC (National Consumers’ Service) has sued the cartel members in both the pharmacies 
and the poultry cartel cases. See Colusión de Medicamentos, SERNAC (Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://www.sernac.cl/colusion-de-medicamenmtos-sernac-demanda-a-salcobrand-cruz-verde-y-
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also help avoid jurisdictional overlaps, conflicting mandates, and potential turf 
wars, and allow agencies to draw on one another’s expertise. 
B. International And Transnational Political Support 
Political support from international and regional organizations may also help 
boost a competition agency’s effectiveness in various ways. International 
organizations such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
and the International Competition Network, provide competition agencies with 
much needed resources and know-how on enforcement issues. The first two have 
working groups focused on various aspects of competition law and its 
enforcement. The third, a virtual network of competition agencies founded in 
2001, aims to promote convergence among national competition laws and 
enforcement practices.88 These three organizations hold regular fora for 
competition agencies from all over the globe to share experiences and exchange 
recommendations. They offer technical assistance to younger competition 
agencies and provide opportunities for voluntary peer reviews of competition law 
and its enforcement.89 These fora create peer groups that foster learning and 
capacity building in younger agencies, and create pressure on them to build and 
maintain a reputation as an independent, effective agency.90 
Regional organizations can also positively influence the effectiveness of 
competition policies within member states, prospective member states, and 
associated countries, as illustrated by the European Union (EU). The EU 
typically includes competition law provisions in its trade and association 
agreements, and candidate countries have to adopt competition laws or modify 
their existing laws to conform to EU legislation in this area.91 The adoption and 
subsequent development of competition laws and policies in Central and Eastern 
Europe was influenced significantly and, for the most part, positively by EU 
membership negotiations.92 The conditionality of the competition provisions in 
 
farmacias-ahumada-y-pide-compensa/ [https://perma.cc/F9YF-J4DG].  
 88.  See Maria Coppola, ICN Best Practices: Soft Law, Concrete Results, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 2 
(July 2011); Marie-Laure Djelic & Thibaut Kleiner, The International Competition Network: Moving 
Towards Transnational Governance, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS 
OF REGULATION 287, 287 (Marie-Laure Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., 2006). 
 89.  The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank also financially support various 
national and regional projects in the area of competition policy, and foster research in this field. 
 90.  For an insightful analysis of many aspects of the ICN’s operations, conceptualizing the ICN as a 
“network of networks,” see Yane Svetiev, Partial Formalization of the Regulatory Network (Mar. 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1564890 [https://perma.cc/HP3B-HLWV]. 
 91.  See Umut Aydin, Promoting Competition: European Union and the Global Competition Order, 
34 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 663, 673–674  (2012) (documenting how the EU has promoted the adoption of 
competition laws in its neighborhood through accession and association agreements); Thomas J. Doleys, 
Promoting Competition Policy Abroad: European Union Efforts in the Developing World, 57 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 337, 340 (2012) (describing the EU’s efforts to export its competition law to developing countries, 
and arguing that the scope of political-legal integration, and market dependence account for the variation 
in outcomes). 
 92.  Eleanor M. Fox, The Central European Countries and the European Union’s Waiting Room: 
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the Customs Union Agreement of 1996 played a key role in the adoption of the 
Turkish competition law, and membership negotiations have contributed to the 
maturation of the Turkish competition authority.93 However, regional 
organizations elsewhere have only recently gone beyond declamatory politics.94 
And in the case of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, the 
aspiration to establish the primacy of a supranational competition regulator 
actually appears to have weakened existing competition agencies at the national 
level, for example, in Senegal.95 
Foreign support can be a double-edged sword, however. On the one hand, 
such support may help alleviate impediments to agency effectiveness by 
addressing issues such as lack of resources and expertise. International and 
regional organizations may also serve as important external anchors for 
competition policy reforms, which may otherwise be blocked by entrenched 
interests, private or public. On the other hand, such foreign support may 
reinforce the perception of competition law as a foreign import, and undermine 
local receptiveness to such laws. Foreign support may also leave less room for 
developing countries to devise competition laws that are more attuned to local 
conditions—which, as Eleanor Fox argues in her contribution to this symposium, 
is critical for ensuring that the competition law and policy serve the interests of 
the country enacting it.96  Such laws also have a better chance of being enforced.97 
Thus, while support from international and regional organizations has been key 
to the effectiveness of competition law and policy in some developing countries, 
there are also significant pitfalls to international involvement. 
C. Embedded Autonomy Rather Than Formalistic Agency Independence 
The independence of regulatory bodies has become a major issue in analyses 
of governance and the evolution of the regulatory state.98 According to the 
conventional wisdom, regulators as “agents” should be independent from elected 
politicians as their nominal political “principals” in order to be able to pursue 
 
Why Must They Adopt the EU’s Competition Law?, in COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN 
EUROPE 31 (Saul Estrin & Peter Holmes eds., 1998).  
 93.  See Umut Aydin & Kemal Kirisci, With or Without the EU: Europeanization of Asylum and 
Competition Policies in Turkey, 18 S. EUR. SOC’Y & POL. 375, 386 (2013). 
 94.  See generally, COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (Josef Drexl, et al. eds., 2011). A few regional bodies, such as COMESA, have since 2011 
established competition agencies or at least moved from long unenforced competition rules toward the 
beginnings of a real competition policy. 
 95.  Mor Bakhoum & Julia Molestina, Institutional Coherence and Effectiveness of a Regional 
Competition Policy:  The Case of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, in COMPETITION 
POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 94, at 96. 
 96.  Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Policy: The Comparative Advantage of Developing Countries, 79 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016. 
 97.  See Gal & Fox, supra note 49, at 303. 
 98.  See, e.g., MARTINO MAGGETTI, REGULATION IN PRACTICE: THE DE FACTO INDEPENDENCE 
OF REGULATORY AGENCIES (2012); Arndt Wonka & Berthold Rittberger, Credibility, Complexity and 
Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies, 33 W. EUR. POL. 730 (2010). 
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their assigned goals without distraction from conflicting agendas, and in 
particular, to ensure that the principals cannot pressure them to abuse their 
regulatory powers for short-term political gains of the elected politicians.99 In 
addition, regulatory bodies need to be autonomous from those whom they 
regulate to prevent capture by special interests.100 These arguments have been 
particularly clearly articulated with regard to central bank independence. Even 
though there are notable differences between central banks and regulatory 
agencies,101 the core arguments in favor of central bank independence and 
autonomy have been said to apply similarly to competition authorities.102 On the 
empirical side, in addition to case studies supportive of the importance of agency 
independence,103 there is statistical evidence that de facto independence of 
competition agencies increases the perceived effectiveness of a country’s anti-
monopoly law or policy.104 Other analyses suggest that both de jure and de facto 
independence of competition agencies leads to significantly higher total factor 
productivity, as well as lower levels of corruption, in both developed and 
developing countries.105 
Does this imply that the optimal institutional arrangement is one that 
maximizes agency independence? Notwithstanding the above arguments and 
findings, the benefits of independence should depend on the strength of the rule 
of law in the country (which is a hallmark of liberal democracy but should be 
considered a distinctive institutional characteristic) and the strength of political 
support for competition policy. Competition agencies thus might not need pure 
independence or autonomy but rather something akin to what Evans, when 
 
 99.  See, e.g., Daniel Y. Kono, Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency, 100 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369 (2006) (discussing the incentives of elected political leaders to use regulations, 
among other means, to provide rents to favored groups in a way that obfuscates political responsibility 
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 100.  For recent reviews of the theoretical literature and assessments of the empirical evidence of the 
causes and consequences of regulatory capture, see PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE:  SPECIAL 
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel P. Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014); 
Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203 (2006). 
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of Delegation to Independent Authorities, 15 COMP. EUR. POL. 303, 306 (2007) (arguing that while 
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extent of political uncertainty). 
 102.  John Vickers, Central Banks and Competition Authorities: Institutional Comparisons and New 
Concerns 14–16 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 331, Nov. 2010). 
 103.  E.g., Fred O. Boadu & Tolulope Olofinbiyi, Regulating the Market:  Competition Law and Policy 
in Kenya and Zambia, 26 WORLD COMPETITION 75, 82, 89 (2003) (suggesting that the stronger record of 
the Zambian agency in controlling monopolies and economic power is due to the greater autonomy of 
that agency). 
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30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 226, 231 (2010). 
 105.  See Stefan Voigt, The Effects of Competition Policy on Development:  Cross-Country Evidence 
Using Four New Indicators, 45 J. DEV. STUD. 1225, 1239–45 (2009). But see Mattia Guidi, The Impact of 
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discussing characteristics of the state that are conducive to adjustment and 
economic growth, called “embedded autonomy.”106 
We have reasoned that competition regulators often need to challenge not 
only the anti-competitive practices of private-sector elites, but also the anti-
competitive practices of state-owned enterprises and unnecessarily competition-
restricting laws and regulations. This reasoning arguably applies particularly 
strongly in developing countries. It implies the need to take on entrenched 
interests of private-sector elites, as well as entrenched interests within the 
government and the state. Any agency to take on such an agenda on its own 
would need to be extraordinarily powerful to stand a chance.107 
Some form of autonomy from the political elite surely is a necessary element 
of the competition agency’s power. However, an agency with such an ambitious 
agenda cannot function effectively without political support.108 Agency budgets 
are customarily subject to legislative approval; competition laws often require 
adjustments, especially during the early years, to make them work in the local 
context; legislative action is needed to keep fines meaningful in high-inflation 
countries; and legislators and regulators in other parts of the executive branch 
need to be responsive to the agency’s advocacy efforts. This dependence on other 
political actors provides ample opportunity for pushback, which creates a need 
for competition agencies to be embedded in the political system—to have 
concrete ties that provide institutionalized channels for negotiation of goals and 
policies109 and enactment of reforms. 
Likewise, a competition agency’s total isolation from society is not desirable 
either. Autonomy from concentrated and powerful economic interests is 
necessary if the competition agency is to effectively enforce the law against such 
interests. At the same time, the agency needs to make a sustained effort to 
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communicate with the public to gain and maintain a good understanding of 
societal preferences and perceptions—and to explain to civil society in a clear 
and persuasive manner the benefits of competition law and policy. The Mexican 
Competition Commission, for instance, sees its sustained efforts to make the 
public aware of the need for competition in the Mexican economy as essential to 
preparing the ground for legislative changes that strengthened the country’s 
competition law.110 An agency’s embeddedness in society is important for gaining 
domestic political allies that generally help it succeed. It also might strengthen 
enforcement efforts by improving the flow of information between the public and 
the agency, and it might possibly even lead to better compliance with the law. As 
both firms and the public at large learn more about cartels and their costs to the 
society, for instance, public naming and shaming starts to become a stronger 
deterrent against cartels. 
IV 
THE SYMPOSIUM: A PREVIEW 
The symposium begins with a paper by Armando Rodriguez and Ashok 
Menon on The Causes of Competition Agency Ineffectiveness in Developing 
Countries.111 The article builds on their important book-length examination of 
why the reality of competition law implementation and competition policy in 
developing countries often falls far short of the ex ante promises and expectations 
of policymakers and legal advisors.112 This disappointing performance arguably 
is especially puzzling since the laws adopted by the new competition jurisdictions 
often incorporate an impressive array of “best practices,” as defined by the 
pioneers of competition law and policy among advanced industrialized countries. 
Rodriguez and Menon’s article in this symposium, however, goes well beyond the 
discussion of practical shortcomings of competition agencies’ enforcement 
practices, which might explain the divergence between the theoretical strengths 
of competition laws on the books and the reality of competition policy practice. 
Specifically, Rodriguez and Menon argue that competition law and policy are in 
the end more likely to do harm than good in the developing world. Markets in 
developing countries, they caution, are very far from the optimal mechanisms for 
the efficient allocation of values through arm’s-length transactions in neoclassical 
economics. The deficiencies of market-supporting institutions—such as dearth of 
trust, weak property rights, and lack of timely and independent administrative or 
judicial contract enforceability—force market participants to rely on a variety of 
non-market mechanisms to make economic exchange possible and not overly 
risky. And what to Western or Northern antitrust analysts readily appear to be 
anti-competitive structures (such as overly close relationships between private 
sector firms and the state) or anti-competitive behaviors (such as price 
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 112.  See RODRIGUEZ & MENON, supra note 4. 
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discrimination to the detriment of economic actors with whom the seller has no 
established relationship) are in fact, Rodriguez and Menon argue, solutions to 
deficiencies in market-supporting institutions, which are efficient in a Coasean 
sense. Therefore, Rodriguez and Menon argue, competition agency interventions 
against anything other than pure “hard-core” or “naked” private-sector cartels 
will jeopardize or even choke off mutually beneficial economic exchanges rather 
than yield gains in efficiency or any other legitimate objective of competition law 
and policy. 
Eleanor Fox’s consciously provocative article, The Comparative Advantage of 
Developing Countries, contrasts with Rodriguez and Menon, offering a glass-half-
full rather than a glass-half-empty perspective.113 Similar to Rodriguez and 
Menon, she argues that OECD countries’ (and especially U.S.) “best practices,” 
designed for well-functioning markets, are often ill-suited for new competition 
jurisdictions in the developing world, which are trying to create market 
competition in an environment of weak institutions and privileged, entrenched 
market players that are often emanations of the state. But she challenges the idea 
that developing countries are limited to a second-rate implementation of first-
world legal blueprints. Rather, she submits, new competition regimes in the 
developing world actually have two advantages compared to the more 
established regimes (even though they find themselves in the sea of handicaps). 
First, not having the baggage of many years of antitrust, developing countries 
have better incentives to design competition law and policy regimes that are well-
adapted to their own needs today. In the older regimes, existing laws and 
enforcement agencies (and the interests that have grown up around them) make 
institutional change path-dependent and efficient institutional adaption difficult. 
New competition regimes in developing countries, by contrast, can (ceteris 
paribus) design competition regimes suitable for their arguably distinctive goals, 
including inclusive development and the need to foster rivalry vis-à-vis the state. 
Second, because some of their most palpable harms arise from hybrid state and 
private restraints at the border, they have better incentives to design and embrace 
a supra-national framework that can help make markets work for them. 
Whereas Rodriguez and Menon’s discussion is mostly categorical, Fox’s 
argument suggests a conditional answer to the two key questions motivating this 
symposium:  She hypothesizes that success—especially with regard to the broader 
objectives of developing countries’ competition laws—should be more likely the 
more a country’s competition law (and its agency’s practices) represent a home- 
  
 
 113.  Fox, supra note 96. 
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grown adaptation rather than an adoption of a foreign template of Western best 
practices. 
William Kovacic and Marianela Lopez-Galdos, the authors of the third article 
after this introduction, address the symposium’s central questions head-on, 
developing a series of conditional answers, and exploring the factors that 
contribute to the successful implementation of competition law principles across 
a large number of competition regimes.114 In Lifecycles of Competition Systems: 
Explaining Variation in the Implementation of New Regimes, Kovacic and Lopez-
Galdos develop an argument about likely trajectories of competition regimes 
over their first twenty to twenty-five years in existence, with a typology based on 
three ideal-types. Based on meticulous primary research that included extensive 
interviews with competition agency officials and other policymakers, as well as 
years of participant observation by one of the authors, they identify the factors 
that improve the prospects for effective implementation. They highlight—and 
examine in much greater detail—several of the factors briefly discussed in this 
introduction (such as funding, expertise, and political support, as well as generally 
supportive collateral institutions) but they also go further. Based on a wealth of 
original research across a large number of new competition regimes, Kovacic and 
Lopez-Galdos find, for instance: Agencies that develop a general capacity and 
specific tools for learning from their own and others’ experiences tend to get on 
(or are able to switch to) a path toward effectiveness. Successful agencies tend to 
assess their capacities periodically, and return to their national legislatures for 
upgrades. 
The article by Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos is followed by three separate single-
country analyses, tracing the development of the competition regimes of Chile, 
Mexico, and China, respectively. In Chilean Antitrust Policy: Some Lessons 
Behind Its Success, Francisco Agüero explores how the Chilean competition 
regime has evolved from a mostly ineffective system when it was established in 
1959 to one of the success stories in Latin America.115 Agüero’s explanation for 
the success of the Chilean competition regime emphasizes its embeddedness in 
the political system, as well as a flourishing competition culture in the country. 
Support from political parties across the ideological spectrum has enabled 
legislative changes in 2003, 2009, and 2016, which have strengthened the Chilean 
competition law and enforcement institutions—an illustration of the “upgrades” 
discussed by Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos. The solid enforcement record of the 
agency and the tribunal, as well as the publicity afforded by the recent discovery 
of a number of cartel cases in key markets, have contributed to a flourishing 
competition culture among economic actors and the society at large. 
Like its Chilean counterpart, the Mexican competition regime is one of the 
success stories in Latin America. It is the focus of Umut Aydin’s contribution to 
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INTRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/29/2016  3:58 PM 
No. 4 2016]   COMPETITION LAW & POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 35 
this symposium.116 In Competition Law and Policy in Mexico: Successes and 
Challenges, Aydin examines what allowed Mexico’s Federal Competition 
Commission, after the mixed record of its first fifteen years, to become a 
generally highly effective enforcement agency more recently. She argues that 
both institutional learning and a series of legislative reforms were critical.  And 
those reforms were made possible by a domestic constituency supportive of 
strengthening Mexico’s competition law, which included civil society actors, 
competition lawyers, and firms trying to break into traditionally dominated 
markets—a coalition consciously fostered by the Competition Commission itself. 
International and transnational actors such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the International Competition Network also 
aided the reform process with their expert assessments and recommendations, as 
well as their political support to help convince the legislators of the need for 
reforms. 
In Competition Law Enforcement in China: Between Technocracy and 
Industrial Policy, Yane Svetiev and Lei Wang explore the reasons behind the 
success of the Chinese competition regime.117 Svetiev and Wang argue that 
Chinese policymakers and enforcers have not blindly followed mature 
competition regimes, but rather have incorporated domestic specificities and 
policy concerns in drafting the law, designing the institutional structure for 
enforcement, and making individual decisions—much like what Fox advocates 
for developing countries’ competition regimes in general. In the face of 
uncertainty about the role and possible effects of a competition instrument, 
Chinese enforcers also sought and received considerable input from market and 
civil society actors regarding their implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law, 
which has allowed them to incorporate multiple policy objectives besides 
efficiency and consumer welfare. As a result, Chinese competition enforcement 
is openly sensitive to a broader set of policy goals compared to the legal and 
technocratic antitrust templates of mature jurisdictions. Such societal 
contestation, according to Svetiev and Wang, both enlivens competition law in 
the Chinese context and has the potential to deliver positive results along various 
public policy dimensions, including developmental and distributional ones. 
Though Chile, Mexico, and China, might all be considered successful cases, it 
is unlikely that all countries will be able to establish effective competition regimes 
at the domestic level. The final article in the symposium, Ralf Michaels’ 
Supplanting Foreign Antitrust, explores the contours of a competition law regime 
that offers a substantial improvement if the status quo is having no “functioning 
antitrust regime.”118 Specifically, Michaels examines under what conditions it is 
desirable for the regulatory agency and courts of a country with a well-
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functioning anti-cartel regime to exercise jurisdiction over cartels that have some 
or even all of their effects in a country without such a regime—in the absence of 
a treaty that might explicitly delegate jurisdiction and possibly even in the 
absence of a request from the latter country’s government.119 After developing a 
proposal that specifies the conditions that would need to be met for such 
“supplanting” to be legitimate, Michaels works through three different scenarios 
or constellations: A multinational cartel case, where an international cartel has 
anti-competitive effects in at least one jurisdiction with a well-functioning 
competition regime and at least one without such a regime; a transnational cartel, 
where firms from one or more countries with a functioning competition regime 
collude to the exclusive detriment of economic actors in a third country without 
such a regime; and strictly “domestic” cartel cases, where the members of the 
cartel, their anti-competitive actions, and those who are thereby harmed all 
reside in a country without an effective competition regime. Only for the 
“domestic” case do a number of possible objections hold, Michaels argues.120 In 
sum, supplanting antitrust allows countries without an effective domestic 




 119.  His analysis focuses exclusively on anti-cartel law and policy; parts may be applicable to other 
competition issues, too, but Michaels explicitly brackets such an extension of his proposal. 
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virtually inconceivable under such conditions. 
